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31 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Headquarters Courier Systems

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1. After a study of the files and a review of the complete matter with [] on 27 October 1961, the status of the OS and the IG recommendations, following the OS Security Survey Report of 9 February 1960, was discussed with [] at the Office of the DD/S (Room 126, East Building, Extension []). [] is the coordinator for the implementing of the recommendations, which require action at various components. Following our discussion, she said the next action is to receive advice from the Office of Personnel, and when she has this she will get in touch with me, probably for a meeting among IG, OP, OL, OCR, RI, and possibly others.

2. The basis for our discussion was the listing of the IG recommendations (which recited those of the OS survey report and added others) on a thermofaxed form, with columns for notes as to the status of action, etc. Going through the form, I explained the position of OS on those matters involving security action, or recommendations by the IG for action by OS. This was as follows:

a. The IG recommended that OS establish a coordinator on all these matters. I advised that I would be acting as such.

b. IG recommendation that OS be designated the place to maintain a complete roster of couriers and courier equipment. I explained that this was not feasible but, rather, this should be done by the Mail and Courier Branch of OL. The key to control of all matters relating to couriers lies in placing them in a courier career designation under M&CBr/OL, including those couriers assigned to or working at other components. This is a matter presently being considered at OP, and awaits its action. (OS has at Building Security Branch a separate file of all approved couriers.)

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c. That OS provide a staffing slot for a full-time courier inspector. I said this was not practical. If all couriers come under the general control of M&CBr/OL, the supervision it would furnish as to its own couriers, and could direct as to those working at other components, should satisfy the inspection requirement. In addition, OS will continue its handling of inquiries into reported irregularities, and also will continue to include courier matters in its surveys at various components and installations. Further, it is generally planned that a new survey of the Headquarters courier systems will be conducted after the completion of the move to the new building.

d. That all components having couriers submit detailed data as to them and their courier systems to OS; and that OL and OS review the data to eliminate duplication. I said this was not an OS function, and the handling of these matters is involved in the originally directed Management Staff study, and the general proposal that all courier systems be placed under M&CBr/OL. However, OS would want to review proposed changes in systems to ensure that security requirements are met.

e. Noting that there has been a failure to requalify couriers in the use of firearms, the IG recommended that individuals involved be reported to OS for requalification without delay. I explained that the OS survey report had noted only one case where the firearms permit of a courier had expired, and this at the Executive Registry; the lapse was corrected immediately after the completion of the OS survey report. Further, however, OS is checking its firearms permits procedures to ensure that action is taken at the various components to avoid lapses, this being included in a new general review of firearms procedures.

f. That OS extend its "current technical interrogation program to all Agency couriers." I advised (after information previously obtained from [redacted])

[redacted] that couriers are staff employees who get the poly test on EOD, and that all M&CBr couriers thereafter are under a program of re-poly once a year. Some other courier groups [redacted] were unable to identify which

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groups) have been under the re-poly program; OCI couriers will be included in the annual re-poly when the workload permits. However, the extension of this annual re-poly program to all couriers cannot be perfected until the central control of all couriers under M&CBr/OL is effected.

g. That OS mount "a vigorous CI operation against" the courier systems. I explained that OS actually is doing as much as it believes advisable along CI lines as to the couriers, and that expanding it to include further elements of a CI operation (such as placing of covert agents among the couriers, developing covert agents among the present couriers, covert surveillances, etc.) does not appear either practical or necessary, would be contrary to what we understand is the general Agency policy, and would be recommended against by OS. All couriers are staff employees, cleared initially for TS and given poly tests before EOD. A person who is recruited for a position as courier, or assigned from elsewhere as a courier, is subjected to a close^R scrutiny by PersSD/OS than an ordinary applicant (this from Mr. [redacted] and more carefully screened; there have been cases where a prospective courier has been approved for general employment but not for courier work; a courier later may be proposed for one of the special types of clearances, so that initially his file is reviewed with this in mind, and in general all couriers are clearable for special types of clearances. Couriers of the M&CBr./OL are given an annual re-poly, and all couriers would be included under this program if the suggested career designation under M&CBr is adopted. Courier functions come under the matters included in all OS surveys, both domestic and overseas. All Agency employees, including couriers, come under the CI work of SRS/OS. By regulatory issuance HB [redacted], all employees are responsible for reporting to OS any indicated or suspected matters of security concern. OS investigates all reported, indicated, or suspected compromises or irregularities affecting the security of the Agency, its installations, or its classified information or material. All this totals to a rather effective CI program.

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h. Listed as a recommendation, although not expressed in such terms, is the IG comment that the Agency regulations do not require that OS give special attention to the courier activity. I said that there are various matters to which OS gives special attention without any regulatory requirement; the foregoing statements show that the courier activity actually is given very special attention.

i. That couriers be provided with a vehicle [redacted]

[redacted] I said one such vehicle is in use, and it would be up to M&CB to requisition from OL further [redacted] However, OS believes that such equipment is a security aid only, and that complete reliance should not be placed on it; [redacted]

j. The IG recommendation [redacted] courier vehicles added a further recommendation that two-way radio telephones be installed in courier vehicles. I said this would be a security advantage which OS would approve, but it was a matter for OL to determine and OS does not make the recommendation.

k. The recommendations that OP reclassify internal building couriers to "messengers," and establish a job classification for this function, are not matters for OS action, but would have the concurrence of OS.

l. The IG recommended "That the Office of Security conduct a survey of the Agency's procedures for classified document control to ensure proper compliance with Executive Order 10501 and pertinent Agency regulations." I said this recommendation is too broad, and actually contains a good part of the actual continuing functions performed by various parts of OS. Surveys can be, and actually are, made of specific places and activities handling classified material, and the handling of classified documents is included in the security survey of specific Headquarters components and

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activities, and of domestic and overseas installations. Procedures and handling practices at individual places are intermittently surveyed, and will continue to be. Regulations are continually under review.

m. The recommendation concerning a manifest-type receipt for bulk courier deliveries, is one that M&CBr and such components as RI will have to implement.

n. The recommendation for the preparation of a Handbook on preparation of materials for pouch or mail transmission, is up to M&CBr/OL to implement.

o. The IG recommended that OL, OP, and OS meet to consider means to prevent improper transmission of postage mail. I explained that it was not an OS function to develop systems, and that in this case OS had pointed out in its survey the fault of the present system. It now appears that OL, specifically its M&CBr, should suggest a better system, and it should be reviewed by OS before being put into practice.

p. The recommendations as to deliveries by courier only to identified authorized persons, is one on which OS understands M&CBr/OL has taken action.

q. The recommendation that outside departments and agencies be requested to have CIA couriers properly identify themselves, is not well worded. The OS survey report pointed out that outside agencies should be sure that their procedures are such as to ensure that material intended for CIA is given only to an identified and authorized CIA representative. It is understood that OCR has made this request of the other agencies. The additional recommendation as to similar advice within CIA actually is covered by adherence to normal secure office practices.

r. The recommendation as to courier trip records is one for implementation by M&CBr/OL, and is included in the stricter supervision the Branch has advised OS it is practicing.

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s. The last listed IG recommendation was that OL and OS jointly investigate the feasibility of reducing the 30 courier delivery points in the Pentagon by the establishment of a special courier center there, with two or more Agency employees assigned to it for internal Pentagon deliveries and collections. I explained that this was desirable from a security standpoint, but the actual establishment of the facility was one for administrative rather than security action, although OS should review the security aspects of the system which would be worked out. [redacted] agreed, but suggested that there be an OS representative on the team; I said this still would not be a proper OS function, and rather OL should work it out with the Agency components whose material is involved, and then submit the proposal for OS review.

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/s/

[redacted]

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